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Deriving predictions from congruence theory, we explored the personal and situational sources of cooperation by contrasting behavior under conditions of personality fit and misfit with culture in an organizational simulation. We assessed MBA students' disposition to cooperate and randomly assigned them to simulated organizations that either emphasized collectivistic or individualistic cultural values. We found that cooperative subjects in collectivistic cultures were rated by coworkers as the most cooperative; they reported working with the greatest number of people, and they had the strongest preferences for evaluating work performance on the basis of contributions to teams rather than individual achievement. Results also showed that cooperative people were more responsive to the individualistic or collectivistic norms characterizing their organization's culture: They exhibited greater differences in their level of cooperative behavior across the two cultures than did individualistic people. We discuss the organizational implications of the conditions influencing behavioral expressions of personal cooperativeness.
Most researchers in organizational behavior and psychology now accept that behavior is a function of characteristics of the person and the environment (Lewin, 1935) and reject the extreme views that either personal characteristics, such as dispositions, or situational characteristics, such as organizational culture, entirely predict behavior. A current challenge stemming from this interactional perspective is to understand when and why certain people's behavior corresponds to or deviates from their personality across time or situations. This is particularly important to understanding cooperation at work-why some people cooperate with their coworkers and others don't. Workplace cooperation has been conceptualized as the willful contribution of employee effort to the successful completion of interdependent organizational tasks (Wagner, 1995: 152) . Cooperative behavior is often manifested in members' willingness to work with others, even when it is not formally demanded, and in preferences for being rewarded for working alone or in groups (e.g., Wageman, 1995). Identifying the conditions under which members are likely to display cooperative behavior is difficult, however, since cooperative behavior can be influenced both by personality, or one's tendency to pursue individualistic or collective goals (e.g., McClintock and Liebrand, 1988) , and by formal and informal control systems that reward individual achievement or cooperative efforts (e.g., Petersen, 1992). Further, understanding cooperative behavior not only requires knowledge of an individual's propensity to cooperate and the situational inducements to cooperate, but also how these factors combine. Our objectives in this study are to add to research that clarifies the conditions under which we should and should not expect to predict behavior from personality and to increase our understanding of the sources of cooperative behavior in organizations. We examine people's disposition to cooperate and the organizational culture in which they act as relevant personal and situational characteristics and then suggest how these Mischel, 1987; Cantor and Kihlstrom, 1989) . Further, people tend to be happier when they are in settings that meet their particular needs or that are congruent with their dispositions (Diener, Larsen, and Emmons, 1984: 582) . Greater person-situation congruence thus increases individuals' effectiveness in that situation and their tendencies to seek out such situations in the future. To predict behavioral outcomes such as job choice and job longevity, organizational researchers have typically compared characteristics of people, such as abilities, preferences, and personality, and characteristics of organizational contexts, such as job demands and organizational or occupational values. Greater fit between a person's values and his or her organization's culture, for example, is associated with behavioral and affective outcomes such as better job performance, longer tenure, and greater commitment to the firm (e.g., O'Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell, 1991). The congruence between personal values and organizational culture has also been shown to be a better predictor of performance, commitment, and length of stay than either characteristic alone (Chatman, 1991) . This logic can be applied to matches between cooperative people and collectivistic cultures. Since a collectivistic organizational culture rewards members for cooperating with others in meeting organizational objectives, people with a disposition to cooperate are likely to demonstrate well-practiced cooperative behaviors in this context, such as working with others rather than alone, and expressing preferences for rewards that are based on team accomplishments. In contrast, since an individualistic organization rewards individualistic members for focusing on their own work, individualistic people are most likely to demonstrate well-practiced individualistic behaviors in this context, such as working alone rather than with others, and expressing preferences for rewards that are based on individual accomplishments. When personality and culture are both oriented to cooperation, cooperative behavior should be higher than it is with any other combination of personality and culture emphasis, while when both personality and culture are oriented to individualism, cooperative behavior should be lower than it is with any other combination of these characteristics. More formally, we predict that personal cooperativeness and organizational culture will each influence cooperative behavior: Hypothesis 1: People who have a high disposition to cooperate and who work in a collectivistic organizational culture will be the most cooperative, while people who have a low disposition to cooperate and who work in an individualistic culture will be the least cooperative.
Cooperative Behavior Resulting from Personalityculture Mismatches
Hypothesis 1 specifies the effects of matches between personal cooperativeness and cultural individualism or collectivism, but it does not specify the likelihood that those in cultures with which they are mismatched will behave in accordance with their personality or, instead, adapt their behavior to fit their organizational culture. Congruence researchers have tended to emphasize fit over misfit 425/ASQ, September 1995 (Schneider, Smith, and Goldstein, 1994) and treat personal and situational characteristics as additive: the better the fit, the happier and more competent the employee (Joyce, Slocum, and Von Glinow, 1982). Under this assumption, even extreme mismatches between personality and culture should result in equivalently "medium" levels of cooperative behavior. The level of cooperative behavior would thus be the same for those with a high disposition to cooperate in individualistic cultures as for those with a low disposition to cooperate in collectivistic cultures. But this may not be the most appropriate prediction. Related research suggests that cooperative people may adjust their behavior more than individualistic people t6 accommodate the cooperative or individualistic norms emphasized in different social settings. In Kelley and Stahelski's (1970a) two-person prisoner's dilemma games, subjects who had self-interested motives behaved individualistically, using an "always defect" strategy, regardless of whether their opponents behaved individualistically or cooperatively. In contrast, when more cooperatively oriented players were presented with a cooperative move, they responded cooperatively, and when presented with a self-interested move, they responded individualistically, using a tit-for-tat strategy. Hypothesis 2: People with a high disposition to cooperate will behave more cooperatively in organizational cultures that emphasize cooperation than in organizational cultures that emphasize individualism, while individualists' lack of cooperative behavior will vary less across the two culture conditions. We modified a business simulation to test the influence of personal cooperativeness and organizational culture on cooperative behavior. We used an experimental design so that we could better isolate culture and personality factors, compare them, and identify specific behavioral outcomes.
METHOD

Subjects
One hundred thirty-nine full-time first-year master's of business administration (MBA) students, enrolled in a mandatory introductory organizational behavior course at a midwestern university participated in this study. Twenty-seven percent were women, 70 percent were white, and 25 percent were not U.S. citizens. The subjects' mean age was 27.28 years, and they had an average of 5.05 years of full-time work experience. These subjects represented a subset (54 percent) of a larger study on organizational culture and group effectiveness. This subset consisted of those students who both participated in the larger study and who completed personality questionnaires relevant to this study. The subjects were unaware of any connection between the questionnaire and their participation in the business simulation. The sample that participated in this study was similar to the larger sample and, more generally, to the average profile of MBA students enrolled in this graduate school. There were no significant differences between mean scores on data common to the smaller and larger sample, which includes all study variables except for the personality data. There are 20 managers in the Looking Glass Inc. simulated organization, ranging from plant managers to vice presidents. These managers are divided among three divisions: Advanced Products (seven managers), Commercial Glass (six managers), and Industrial Glass (seven managers). Equivalent numbers of subjects of the same sex, ethnic background, and citizenship were randomly assigned to a role within an organization without regard to their score on the personal cooperativeness measure.
The experimental manipulation was a between-subjects design. Subjects for whom we had collected personality data were randomly assigned (along with students from whom we did not collect personality data) to one of 14 simulated organizations. There were seven individualistic and seven collectivistic culture conditions, and each simulated organization had either a collectivistic or individualistic culture that was presented to all subjects in that condition. Thus, the subjects in each organization were interacting with other subjects who received the same culture manipulation. The 14 organizational simulations were run during two days within a single week. Subjects were asked not to discuss their activities with others who had not yet participated, and debriefing did not occur until all the simulations were complete.
Subjects were given their Looking Glass Inc. packet the night before participating in the simulation. Each packet contained their role assignment, detailed background information about the firm, memos (depending on the role assignment, packets included between 25 and 30 memos on which subjects needed to take action or make a decision, and 5 to 10 informational memos), procedural instructions for the next day, and the manipulation-check questionnaire. Subjects were instructed to review the materials to become familiar with their role, but they were not allowed to make any decisions or discuss the simulation with anyone before participating.
Upon arriving, subjects were directed to their assigned organization, were seated at a desk with their name and job title on it, and were provided with various office supplies.
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Subjects spent two and one-half hours dealing with issues from their in-basket in any way that they chose (written memos to others, conversations with others, on their own, etc.). A messenger service was available if subjects wanted to "mail" memos to other members of their organization. Experimenters' assistants who had been trained not to interfere with the experiment collected and delivered mail every 15 minutes during the simulation. Following the simulation, subjects completed an extensive survey requesting information about their experience during the simulation and asking them to rate their division coworkers, as described below.
Independent Variables
We used a pilot study to develop the personal cooperativeness measure and the culture manipulations. Pilot-study participants were 59 first-year MBA students from a West-Coast university. Nearly 35 percent were women, 29 percent were nonwhite, 40 percent were not U.S. citizens, their average age was 27.12 years, and they had an average of 4.44 years of work experience. Pilot-study participants were also enrolled in a mandatory organization behavior class and completed pilot instruments as part of their class requirements. All students in the class were assigned to a collectivistic or individualistic culture condition, with the exception of one student who was absent on the day of the culture manipulation pilot test.
Pilot-test participants completed an in-basket exercise, rather than the more elaborate Looking Glass Inc. simulation. All participants played the same role, that of a newly appointed plant manager of a hypothetical large electronics manufacturing firm. They were told that they were replacing the previous manager who had died suddenly, that the announcement of their placement had not yet been made, and that they were reviewing their in-basket on a Saturday before leaving for an international trip that could not be canceled. Thus, participants were not able to contact "coworkers," and each worked alone on his or her in-basket tasks.
Experimental manipulation of collectivistic and individualistic culture. We pilot tested three culture manipulations that were subsequently used in the Looking Glass Inc. simulation. First, the culture at Looking Glass Inc. (a different company name was used in the pilot test) was manipulated through the exercise instructions. In addition to providing various administrative information (e.g., organization chart, list of employees, calendar), we added the individualistic or cooperative version of the following paragraph to the company description appearing on the first page of each subject's materials: The second and third manipulations were interspersed between the 20 other items in the in-basket pilot study and between the 30-40 memos in packets distributed to subjects in the main Looking Glass Inc. study. The second culture manipulation consisted of an invitation to an "Individuals [or Teams] are the Reason for our Success" awards celebration. Award winners were listed on the invitation either with individual names (individualistic culture condition) or as entire work teams (collectivistic culture condition). Third, information about subjects' compensation and bonus was manipulated. In the individualistic culture condition, subjects were informed that their bonus was "based on individual-achievement and the individual's contribution to Looking Glass Inc.'s performance," and in the collectivistic condition the bonus was "based on teamwork and the team's contribution to Looking Glass Inc.'s performance."
To assess the effectiveness of these culture manipulations, pilot-test participants were asked to complete an "Organizational Culture Diagnosis Survey" immediately after turning in their in-basket materials. They rated 13 dimensions of the organizational culture, four of which were relevant to individualism-collectivism, on a 7-point Likert-type scale Personality measures of cooperation. We also used the pilot study to gather reliability and validity information on the personal cooperativeness measure. We used both self-and peer ratings to develop the measure. While there are existing measures of a closely related construct, individualism-collectivism, we chose to develop our own measure of the disposition to cooperate because existing individualism-collectivism scales do not focus on aspects of a cooperative personality. For example, Wagner and Moch's (1986) scale assessed attitudes, values, and norms, Erez and Earley's (1987) scale measured cultural values, and Triandis et al's (1988) measure, augmented by Hui's (1988) scale, examined concern for others in an in-group, differentiation between others in an in-group, and self-reliance. Because the extent to which these measures are independent or overlapping is unclear (Wagner, 1995), and because we were interested in focusing on personality, we preferred to use preexisting measures that were developed and tested explicitly for assessing personality.
Pilot-study subjects were given a take-home packet of paper-and-pencil personality inventories during the seventh week of their school term. Each also completed these inventories for three preassigned classmates with whom he or she was well acquainted (friendship ties were assessed in 430/ASQ, September 1995 Cooperation a prior class). Pilot-study subjects were also unaware of any connection between these inventories and their participation in the in-basket exercise and unaware of the study hypotheses.
Personal cooperation was constructed from Likert responses (using a 5-point scale from 1 = "strongly disagree" to 5 = "strongly agree") to two self-assessment measures: (1) the 11 -item School Cooperativeness Scale (Roberts, 1991), which assessed subjects' feelings about cooperative behavior in their general study practices and in group projects (e.g., "I find more satisfaction working towards a common group goNal than working alone," and "I think cooperation helps everyone in the group"); and, (2) 91, average interrater correlation = .53), and the four profiles were combined to create a template of a cooperative culture. Pilot-study subjects Q-sorted the same 54 values in terms of how desirable each would be in their ideal organizational culture. As predicted, the more cooperative subjects were, the more they desired an organizational culture emphasizing cooperation (r = .33, p < .005).
Second, we viewed the correlation between self-and peer ratings as representing, in part, the extent to which others recognized the cooperative disposition in a focal person. We computed a mean of the three peer-assessment ratings of the combined 23-item personal cooperativeness scale (interrater reliability = .68). The combined peer-assessment cooperation scale was then correlated with the self-report personal cooperation measure (r = .48, p < .001). This correlation is higher than typical correlations found between self and peers, which is generally below r = .30 (Funder and Colvin, 1988: 152), providing evidence that a cooperative disposition is recognizable and that the scales used to measure it are valid. For the main study, personal cooperativeness was measured with the self-report version of the scale described in the pilot study, consisting of the mean of the School Cooperativeness Scale (Roberts, 1991) and the Agreeableness Scale from the Big Five Factor Inventory (John, 1990). We standardized the means of each of the subscales and computed the overall mean. The nonstandardized mean for the scale was 4.94 (s.d. = .64) on a scale of 1 through 7. The interitem reliability of the self-report personal cooperativeness scale was, again, .81. For the analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) described in the results section, we dichotomized personal cooperativeness scores by splitting the sample at the median (z-score median = .011). Thus, the pilot study used peer measures to determine the validity and reliability of the scale, while the main study used only the self-report measure to assess personal cooperativeness, to avoid overburdening subjects. As described above, subjects were assigned to either a collectivistic or an individualistic culture condition without regard to their personal cooperativeness scores. A t-test confirmed that there were no significant differences (t = Dependent Variables: Assessing Cooperative Behavior Three dependent variables, drawn from different sources and methods, were used to assess cooperative behavior in the main study. First, on the follow-up survey each subject assigned a rating from 1 (extremely low) to 7 (extremely high) on a single item that asked how "affiliative, cooperative, and interested in teamwork" each of the other five or six members of their division, including themselves, was during the simulation. Subjects' behavioral cooperativeness during the simulation was calculated as the mean performance evaluation generated by the five or six other division members, excluding each subject's self-rated cooperativeness score. Cronbach's alpha can provide a reliability of the mean of the judges by treating raters as items making up a scale and ratees as cases (e.g., Cronbach, 1951; Nunnally, 1978) . The alpha coefficient representing the internal consistency of the five or six ratings by other division members of focal individuals' cooperative behavior was .46. Second, subjects were asked to report the number of people they met with, to address four priority items during the simulation. Because subjects were not instructed to meet with others during the simulation, meeting with a greater number of people may represent a willingness to cooperate to resolve problems. The mean of these four scores was averaged into one scale and used as a self-reported behavioral measure of cooperativeness.
Finally, subjects completed an appraisal-weights task, which involved their responding to a request from the CEO and the Human Resources Department to provide input on how the company's performance appraisal form should be revised. Subjects decided how heavily to weight each of nine characteristics on the performance appraisal form by allocating any number of points to each (including "0" 432/ASQ, September 1995 Cooperation points), as long as the nine combined categories added up to 100 points. The performance appraisal categories were as follows: analytic/systematic thinking, communication sklills, conceptual thinking, influence, organizational astuteness, planning and organization, results orientation, teamwork, and individual contribution. We then created a ratio of the number of points given to teamwork ("Works effectively with others to create and/or accomplish a shared goal or mission." "Works effectively in a group.") as compared with the number of points given to individual achievement ("Works effectively alone to create and/or accomplish his/her goals and responsibilities." "Takes independent action to address critical issues."). A higher score indicated a greater orientation toward collectivism than individualism. Control Variables Since subjects' race, sex, and citizenship could affect their propensity to behave cooperatively, we created dichotomous variables for each and included them as control variables in the analyses. Additionally, because subjects interacted with others, their behavior could be affected by other group members' behaviors. Research has shown that demographic differences among group members causes in-group/outgroup biases (Brewer, 1979) . Those who are most different in terms of various demographic characteristics, or who are out-group members, are also viewed as less cooperative (Tsui, Egan, and O'Reilly, 1992). Cox, Lobel, and McLeod (1991) found greater cooperative. behavior among groups from mixed races or collectivistic traditions than from homogeneous races that emphasized individualistic traditions. Therefore, in addition to measuring simple demography variables, we calculated relational demography scores and included these as controls in all equations. A relational demography score is the difference between a subject and all the other subjects in his or her division on race, sex, and citizenship. Each difference is represented by a score ranging from 0 to 1, and higher scores represent greater differences between the person and other division members on each dimension. Following Tsui, Egan and O'Reilly (1992), we measured relational demography using the equation [ 
Manipulation Check
As in the pilot test, subjects in the main study completed the Organizational Culture Diagnosis Survey. This was done the night before the simulation, after they reviewed the materials but before they participated in the simulation.
ANOVA results showed significant differences in the expected directions between the culture conditions. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations among the variables. Correlations among dependent variables reveal some evidence of convergence. For example, rated cooperative behavior was positively correlated with interaction with others and the appraisal-weights task. Hypothesis Tests We used ANCOVA to examine the influence of personal cooperation (high or low), organizational culture (individualistic or collectivistic), and the interaction of the two, on the three dependent variables measuring subjects' cooperative behavior during the simulation. Control variables entered in all of the analyses consisted of simple demography variables (sex, age, and citizenship), as well as comparable relational demography variables measuring subjects' similarity to others. Hypothesis 1 predicted two effects: (1) that cooperative subjects in the matched cooperative condition would behave significantly more cooperatively than would subjects in the other three conditions, and (2) that individualistic subjects in the matched individualistic condition would behave significantly less cooperatively than subjects in each of the other three conditions. These effects were tested using a priori contrasts comparing the two matched groups, 434/ASQ, September 1995 respectively, with each of the three other conditions. Each comparison is presented in the last column of Table 2 . Table 2 shows that cooperative subjects in the collectivistic culture (group 4) were significantly more cooperative than individualistic subjects in the individualistic culture (group 1), as indicated by their coworkers' ratings of cooperativeness (F = 17.03, p < .001), the number of people they reported interacting with (F = 12.60, p < .001), and their preference for collectivism over individualism in the appraisal-weights task (F = 16.79, p < .001). The matched cooperative subjects (group 4) also demonstrated significantly more cooperative behavior than did individualistic subjects in the collectivistic culture (group 2) for rated cooperative behavior Subjects in the matched individualistic condition (group 1) behaved less cooperatively than the subjects in the matched cooperative condition (group 4) across the three dependent variables, as reported above. They were also significantly less cooperative than individualistic subjects in the collectivistic culture (group 2) on the appraisal-weights task (F = 6.80, p < .01). Only a marginally significant difference emerged for the number of people subjects interacted with (F = 2.10, p < .10), and no significant difference emerged for rated cooperative behavior (F = 1.49, n.s.). Finally, subjects in the matched individualistic condition (group 1) reported interacting with significantly fewer people than cooperative subjects in the individualistic culture (group 3) (F = 4.94, p < .05), but no significant differences emerged for rated cooperativeness (F = .01, n.s.) or for the appraisal weights task (F = .83, n.s.). Of the 15 nonredundant comparisons predicted in hypothesis 1 (counting the comparison between the matched groups 1 and 4 only once), 10 are significant in the predicted direction, two are marginally significant in the predicted direction, and the remaining three are not significant. Hypothesis 1 is, therefore, partially supported.
RESULTS
Cooperation
Testing hypothesis 2 takes the analyses in hypothesis 1 a step further by examining the interaction of personal cooperativeness and culture. We compared the difference in level of cooperative behavior between those with a high disposition to cooperate in the two culture conditions (groups 3 and 4) with the difference between those with a low disposition to cooperate in the two culture conditions (groups 1 and 2). As shown in Table 2 performance appraisal form in the appraisal-weights task. Subjects with a higher disposition to cooperate emphasized collectivism in their appraisal-weights task significantly less' in an individualistic organizational culture than in a collectivistic culture. Subjects with a low disposition to cooperate in the two conditions also differed in their relative emphasis on collectivism versus individualism in the appraisal-weights task but did so significantly less than the subjects with a high disposition to cooperate (F = 3.92, p < .05). Taken together, results for these two dependent variables show that subjects with a high disposition to cooperate behaved more consistently with their culture condition, cooperatively in the collectivistic culture and individualistically in the individualistic culture. Individualistic people, however, showed more consistent levels of individualistic behavior regardless of whether their culture emphasized individualistic or collectivistic norms. No significant interaction effect emerged for the number of people subjects reported interacting with (F = .01, n.s.); thus hypothesis 2 was also partially supported. When subjects and the simulated organizational culture they worked in were both more cooperative than individualistic, these cooperative subjects were rated by coworkers as behaving more cooperatively, met and worked with more of their coworkers, and emphasized collectivism over individualism in recommendations for revising the organizations' performance appraisal rating criteria. When both the person and situation emphasized less cooperativeness, however, lower cooperative behavior emerged for some indicators, (as predicted) but not for coworkers' ratings of cooperative behavior. These findings are somewhat consistent with typical congruence findings in that person and situation characteristics had a stronger combined effect than either alone, particularly when personality and organizational culture both emphasized cooperativeness. But the mixed findings here also require considering the interaction between personal cooperativeness and organizational culture, as specified in hypothesis 2. creative behavior (e.g., Amabile, 1988) . And the societal stigma and potential punishment (e.g., going to jail) may be strong enough that honest people may resist becoming dishonest even when dishonesty is promoted in their surroundings, while dishonest people may become much more honest when strong norms for honesty exist. Studying these kinds of matches between personality and culture could reveal aspects of organizational behavior and events that otherwise remain a mystery.
